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THE BIRTH OF A PARTISAN JUDICIARY, 1910-1911

The constitutional convention of 1910 was by no means the first
such gathering held during the territorial period. Nor was it the first
fruitful exercise in constitution-making. The struggle for statehood
had been long and arduous, lasting from 1846 until 1912. During
that period three especially serious attempts to achieve the admission
of New Mexico as a state resulted in conventions, each one drawing
up a constitution. All of these constitutions, dated 1850, 1872, and
1889, had a separate article setting up the organization, function,
and jurisdiction of the courts. Each article, reflecting the political
climate of its time, represented a stage in the evolution of the judiciary which was eventually established under the state constitution
of 1910.
What this progression of constitutions meant was that the territory
was maturing politically. In an era of isolation, the period including
the constitutions of 1850 and 1872, both judges and their felt need
for certain tenure were respected. These early documents provided
an appointive judiciary virtually free from the threat of removal.
Supreme Court justices-as envisioned by the framers of the first
constitution-were simply to carry out their judicial duties. In the
more complex days of the 1880s, constitution-makers were not so
naive. Content to leave qualified Supreme Court justices appointive,
though fairly easily removable, the framers made district court
offices elective and subject to direct political influence.' This change
in attitude toward the courts and their role in the political process
grew during the remaining years of the territorial period.
In addition to internal political maturation, the change also reflected a growing objection to external control over judicial personnel, which resulted from presidential appointment of territorial
judges.' The espoused desire was to make the courts responsive to
the will of the people and their representatives in the legislature. The
1. Proposed N.M. Const. art. 6 (1889). See also R. Larson, New Mexico's Quest for
Statehood, 1846-1912. at 161-68 (1968).
2. For the history of the territorial judiciary see A. Poldervaart, Black-Robed Justice
(1948).
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constitution of 1889 clearly demonstrated this. Thomas B. Catron
(leader of the political group trying to control the courts) cleverly
used it as his basic argument in an 1896 address to the New Mexico
Bar Association that focused on two main points. First, he complained about presidential appointment of Supreme Court justices,
maintaining that such a system resulted in a judiciary whose members were responsible only to the President and the federal government. According to Catron, the temptation to ingratiate themselves
with the appointing power was thus too great, causing these men
...to overlook the rights of the people, to slime over litigation, to
practice favoritism and truckle to the government, and at the same
time by sustaining each other's opinions and rulings, establish a
reputation of being infallible-a weakness which is encouraged by
the condition of things.
Second, Catron advocated change, maintaining that "judges who
are directly responsible to the people or local authorities, would not
give way to such weakness." At the very least he wanted a system
whereby a separate review court sat in judgment of cases on appeal.
This was to be an impartial and independent court, concerned only
with doing right. Throughout, he came consistently back to the
theme of giving a voice to the people, those immediately interested
in the administration of the judicial system.' Catron, influential in
the writing of the 1889 constitution, wielded similar influence in
1910.
By 1906 open advocacy of direct election of judges found its way
into the minutes of the bar association's annual session, generated, of
course, by the desire for a responsible judiciary. Addressing the
association, Alonzo B. McMillen got into the matter of the best
method of judicial selection. Defending the direct election system, he
rejected the notions that the people could not intelligently select
judges and that they could be too easily influenced in their choices
by politicians and especially lawyer politicians. He also dismissed the
appointive system as preferable. He did so by arguing that a judiciary
lost its independence and thereby its ability to administer justice in
the interest of the people when its judges were responsible for their
appointment and tenure to either the executive or legislative branch.
But perhaps most significant was the very manner in which McMillen
opened his discussion of judicial selection: "The lawyers of New
Mexico should be intensely interested in having the very best judicial
system that can be devised." 4 For the lawyer delegates who attended
3. 1896 N.M. B. Ass'n Minutes 13, 15, 17.
4. 1906 N.M. B. Ass'n Minutes 53.
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the constitutional convention of 1910, "the very best judicial system" was indeed an issue. The majority, moreover, reflected the
attitude toward the courts and their role in the political process that
had been growing throughout the territorial period.
When the constitutional convention opened in 19 10, the condition
of things political had in appearance changed very little since the late
1880s and 1890s. Republican leaders, now designated "Old Guard,"
dominated the scene and perpetuated their predominance for some
years into the statehood period. The legal community consisted
primarily of "railroad lawyers," and many of its members closely
allied themselves with the Republican party. In fact, so overwhelmingly superior was the Old Guard organization and control of political conditions that Republicans attained 71 seats at the convention,
leaving 28 to the Democrats and one to a Socialist. In this sense the
constitution drafted along with its judicial article were products of a
conservative era, an era shaped by men who were attempting to
spawn a new one in that same image. That their control was tenuous
at best became clear in the years up to 1930. During that time they
lost about as many statewide elections as they won.'
A spirit of partisanship ruled from the outset. Indeed, the Old
Guard allegedly proclaimed it was their purpose to have a Republican
convention and to frame a Republican constitution. Leading Republicans who attended and who shaped the constitution as finally
written were Thomas B. Catron, Charles A. Spiess, Charles Springer,
Holm 0. Bursum, Albert B. Fall, Clarence J. Roberts, Frank W.
Parker, and Soloman Luna. Main spokesman for the Democratic
minority was Harvey B. Fergusson, leader of the so-called "irreconcilables," a faction of Democrats determined to write a progressive
constitution. 6 Fergusson and his faction aside, the makeup of the
total delegation was definitely conservative, its basic outlook on
government and economics influenced but little by the progressive
ideas making headway throughout the rest of the nation in 1910.'
Ideologically conservative, the delegates also represented the special interest groups most concerned in the affairs of New Mexico:
railroads, coal mining companies, copper mines, the sheep industry,
cattle interests, and land grants, the last being most powerfully represented. Ethnically, the membership stood at 65 of Anglo-American
5. J. Homes, Politics in New Mexico 145-49 (1967), provides a good discussion of the
politics of the period.
6. Mabry, New Mexicos Constitution in the Making-Reininiscences of 1910. 19 New
Mexico Historical Review 172-74 (1944).
7. Donnelly, The Making of the New Mexico Constitution. 12 New Mexico Quarterly
Review 435 (1942).
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descent and 35 of Spanish descent.' The 32 attorneys attending the
convention comprised the largest occupational group, a reflection of
the leading political role played by the "railroad lawyers" during the
territorial days and on into the statehood period. 9
Concerning the continuing influence of attorneys in the political
process, it might well be noted here that of the 32 in attendance,
seven later served on the state Supreme Court: Roberts, Parker, Herbert F. Raynolds, Stephen B. Davis, Charles R. Brice, Andrew
Hudspeth, and Thomas J. Mabry. Indeed, until January 1, 1951, the
New Mexico State Supreme Court was not without one or more
members who had served in the convention.
Whatever the philosophical, interest group, ethnic, or occupational
makeup of the delegation, Republican control was complete. The
Republican majority-directed by the leaders of the party-kept a
tight grasp on the convention, usurping a task normally falling to the
president of such a convention, in this case Spiess. They did so by
passing a resolution providing for a 21 member committee on committees chaired by Solomon Luna. This special committee selected
all committees and their members and, in addition, did the primary
work of the convention, dictated the policies of the Republican
majority, and had the final say as to the ultimate adoption of any
and all articles of the constitution.1 0 What this meant, of course, was
that the Republican caucus dictated the drafting of the judicial
article.
The judicial department, committee number six, included some of
the convention's more prominent Republicans. Serving as chairman
was Parker, then a territorial justice and an elected member of the
first state Supreme Court. Other major Republican members were
Catron, chosen as United States Senator in 1912; Roberts, also an
elected member of the first Supreme Court; Fall, the other of New
Mexico's first United States Senators; Raynolds, a later member of
the Supreme Court; and Reed Holloman, later a district judge.
Among the Democratic members only Granville A. Richardson, a
district judge during the statehood period, could be called noteworthy, with none of the Democrats subsequently serving on the
high bench.'
8. Heflin, New Mexico Constitutional Convention, 21 New Mexico Historical Review
61-62 (1946).
9. Larson, supra note 1, at 275.
10. R. Twitchell, 2 The Leading Facts of New Mexican History 585-86 (1912-1917), and
Tittman, New Mexico Constitutional Convention: Recollections, 27 New Mexico Historical
Review 183 (1952).
11. Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the Proposed State of New Mexico.
Oct. 3-Nov. 21, 1910, Santa Fe, N.M., 14 (1910).
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The intent of the committee from the outset was to produce an
elected judiciary. Democrat Richardson early filed a resolution calling for judges of all courts to be elected by the people, with the
Supreme Court to be made up of three members, each of whom was
to be selected for a period of not less than ten years. Significantly,
Richardson called for the membership of this court to be nonpartisan.' 2 The nature of the elections, whether partisan or nonpartisan,
did generate debate; the matter of an elected judiciary did not. While
some Republicans and some Democrats fought for an appointive
system, the overwhelming majority of both parties favored the election of all judges.' ' The larger legal community also supported this
majority position. Members of the Las Cruces bar, for example,
responding to a letter from Parker soliciting lawyers' opinions,
expressed a preference for an elected Supreme Court.'"
As the proceedings continued, the one major area of party disagreement continued to be the nature of elections. Here, the Democrats tried through a minority report to change a totally unrelated
section of the majority committee report, one dealing with district
attorneys (section 23), to one dealing with the nonpartisan election
of judges. Their substitute read that at elections for Supreme and
district court judges, "no candidate for such offices shall be nominated by any political party or convention." Nominations were to
be by petition, with the names of all candidates placed on the ballot;
the top vote-getters were to be the winners. This major difference
alone remained, for both parties agreed with minor variation on the
basic structure (three members with an option to increase the total
to five after 1920) and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. They also
seemed to agree on six-year terms for the justices.' '
Yet from the time of the proceedings as printed to the final
adoption of the article on the judiciary. changes did occur. The
entire convention considered the article on November 9. At that
meeting voting split along party lines, with every minority amendment readily defeated, including one last attempt at a nonpartisan
judiciary. The amendments that did win approval were those amendments committee chairman Parker introduced. Most were minor in
nature, the one exception was concerned with length of term for
high court judges. Parker proposed an amendment making the length
of term for Supreme Court judges eight years instead of six. It, like
the other amendments he sponsored, passed handily.' 6
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Santa Fe New Mexican,
Mabry, supra note 6, at
Santa Fe New Mexican,
Proceedings, supra note
Santa Fe New Mexican,

Oct. 12, 1910, and Proceedings, supra note 11, at 22.
173.
Oct. 22, 1910.
11, at 136-37, 143-44.
Nov. 9, 1910.
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The article on the judiciary received its final reading and adoption
on November 18. Its provisions require no detailed examination here,
although certain observations are in order. First, the long-developing
trend toward an elected judiciary found its realization in 1910. That
partisan elections won out over nonpartisan elections reflected the
confidence of Old Guard Republicans who, fresh from their smashing
victories in the election of convention delegates, felt sure they were
to dominate state politics for years to come. Second, the lawyers
most certainly took care to see that the best selection method from
their point of view was adopted. All the leading members of the
judiciary committee were lawyers. All were also Republicans. Even
lawyers not attending the convention sought to protect what they
perceived to be a vested interest. Third, Frank W. Parker, chairman
of the committee, played an inordinately influential role in drafting
the article as finally adopted. It was more than mere coincidence that
he served on the Supreme Court until his death in 1932. Finally,
Democratic objections to the judicial system as set up were voiced
many times as the parties drew lines in the ensuing campaign for
constitutional ratification. All in all, the constitution of 1910 was
most conservative in nature, and nowhere was this more clearly evident than in the article concerning the judiciary.
The convention ended on November 21, 1910, with 19 Democratic delegates voting against the constitution, although all but seven
of these later signed the document. Still, many Democratic leaders,
not all of them delegates, continued to fight ratification until election day. Indeed, they met in Santa Fe and issued a statement of
objections, dated December 17, 1910, for consideration by the
voters. They specified 13 reasons for so objecting, the second and
third items referring specifically to these shortcomings concerning
the judiciary: the inexcusable extravagance of the provisions establishing the judiciary system (too many judicial districts and too high
salaries); the investment of power in the legislature to create additional judicial offices in a district without constitutional limitation;
the lack of a nonpartisan judiciary; and excessive length of judicial
terms of offices.' 7
Generally, then, the Democratic party as an organization opposed
the constitution as submitted and fought its adoption on the basis of
its conservative character, particularly with reference to the lack of
direct democracy provisions. The judiciary as well as other constitutional provisions also aroused concern. But Democratic forces found
themselves badly split, so much so that the party's central committee
17. Twitchell, supra note 10, at 586-88.
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necessarily resolved that party loyalty was not to be tested by the
vote on the constitution, with all Democrats free to vote as "their
conscience should dictate."' I The irreconcilables, hardly satisfied by
such temperance, carried on the fight against ratification. Their
leader was Harvey B. Fergusson.
Fergusson, a demagogic orator and writer in the best progressive
tradition, had actually undertaken his campaign against any such
conservative constitution before the 1910 document was a reality.
Between the time of delegate selection and the convention itself,
Fergusson debated Attorney General Frank W. Clancy on the making
of a constitution before a gathering at the University of New Mexico.
Arguing eloquently for the provisions of direct democracy, Fergusson concluded on the note that "it is therefore, earnestly to be
hoped that if, by the influence of special interests, these progressive
provisions are not interested in the constitution, the people will
reject it." He felt that a reassembled convention, so instructed by the
vote of the people, had to yield on these matters. But, "if not," said
Fergusson, "let us reject statehood on such debasing conditions."' 9
Fergusson did, of course, continue the fight during the convention, speaking out for progressive principles whenever he could. One
such opportunity presented itself on November 9, the day the judiciary article reached the floor before the entire convention. He expressed opposition to partisan elections because it meant exposing
the highest judges to the fury of politics and the need to solicit large
campaign contributions.' 0 Still, his most concerted efforts against
the constitution came in the post-convention ratification struggle.
They consisted of speeches, newspaper articles, letters, and a printed
treatise.
He began his letter-writing campaign on November 29, dashing off
14 letters to various people throughout the territory, and continued
it up to election day. He wrote the same messages over and over
again, stressing the need to defeat what he perceived to be an antiprogressive, pro-vested-interest document: "By all means let us
defeat this abortion called the constitution which is intended to
protect the ring which has mis-govemed New Mexico for twenty
years-perhaps for another full twenty years under the New
State.'
Sometimes he itemized objections to specific constitutional provisions, always including the article on the judiciary.
18. Mabry, supra note 6, at 171; and Donnelly, supra note 7, at 446.
19. H. Fergusson & F. Clancy, The Making of a Constitution 14 (1910).
20. Santa Fe New Mexican, Nov. 9, 1910.
21. Letters from Harvey B. Fergusson to W. A. Merrill and R. G. Bryant, Nov. 29, 1910,
in Harvey B. Fergusson Letters, on file in University of New Mexico Library.
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Throughout, he decried the lack of party unity and the support
rendered the constitution by many leading Democrats. 2 2
His printed treatise, "The CONSTITUTION: Its Dangers and
Defects," further demonstrated the extent of his opposition. The
constitution warranted defeat, he wrote, because of its lack of direct
legislation provisions and a corrupt practices law. It warranted defeat
because those in control at the convention were railroad corporations
and their agents and attorneys, powerful oil companies, and various
county bosses, "making up the territorial ring." The constitution
warranted defeat, moreover, because of its very provisions, some
"absurd," some "jokers," and still others "pernicious." Among these
Fergusson cited Article VI on the judiciary, calling it "one of the
most objectionable provisions of the constitution. '"23
Fergusson, joined by a number of his fellow Democrats, did not
stand alone in opposing ratification of the constitution. On January
19, 1911, two days before the election, a committee composed of
ministers, church members, temperance people, and members of the
anti-saloon league and Women's Christian Temperance Union met
and issued a statement against the constitution. Of great significance,
especially in view of court interpretations concerning the powers of
the corporation commission during the nascent statehood years, was
the committee's statement that "most dangerous to pure government
and justice is the judiciary provision and the railroad-commission
clause." Seeing the commission as a figurehead whose orders were
not to go into effect until passed upon by the high bench, the committee predicted that
This means that the railroads will dictate the nomination and
election of judges to the supreme court, as in California, for years,
and the supreme court will of necessity become corrupt, prostituting

the highest tribunal of justice in the state.
The absence of a direct primary system and the provision for electing
judges at the general election also meant that judges were to become
the tools of bosses and were themselves to be pure politicians. 2 4
In spite of efforts to defeat the constitution, pro-ratification
forces won the fight. The Republican party was at the pinnacle of its
strength, having controlled the selection of convention delegates and
the document they wrote. It suffered from no lack of unity during
the ratification campaign. Indeed, the party enjoyed the company
22. Letter from Harvey B. Fergusson to E. C. de Baca, Dec. 3, 1910, in Fergusson
Letters, supra note 21.
23. H. Fergusson, The Constitution: Its Dangers and Defects 1-3 (1911).
24. House Comm. on the Territories, Constitution for the Proposed State of New
Mexico, 62d Cong., 1st Sess., 70-71 (1911).
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and assistance of a number of Democrats. Furthermore, the people
of New Mexico, truly anxious for statehood, were not likely to turn
down the constitution, for its conservative nature could but prove an
asset with William Howard Taft as President. These advantages plus
superiority of organization proved decisive.
Superior Republican organization meant a multi-faceted campaign for ratification. For one thing, it meant the solicitation of
money. Holm Bursum, chairman of the Republican central committee for New Mexico, sent letters to county leaders asking for donations. In one such letter requesting 50 dollars to help with the
campaign, he stated, "We cannot run any chances of either being
defeated or having the majority cut down. I hope to have this campaign well started by the first of January." '2 For another, it meant
that leading Republicans took to the hustings to promote ratification. Clarence J. Roberts, a territorial justice, wrote Secundino
Romero, convention delegate and boss of San Miguel County, "After
next Sunday I will be footloose for a couple of weeks. Is there
anything I can do in your county to help along Statehood?" 2 6
It even meant a possible effort to rig the election, such an allegation finding its way into the House of Representatives Committee on
the Territories hearings held in February 1911. Introduced on behalf
of the protesting citizens of New Mexico, the charge was that there
was only one printed ballot in many counties, one distributed by the
secretary of the Republican committee and clerk of the territorial
Supreme Court, Jose D. Sena. A supposed copy of a Sena letter to
one of the county committeemen showed Sena's instructions concerning the printing of ratification ballots. In those instructions Sena
was quoted as saying, "Be sure if you can to see that no ballots
against the constitution are printed." 2 7
Whatever the truth of this charge, the outcome of the ratification
election was never in doubt. The constitution carried the state by a
vote of 31,742 to 13,399. Statehood awaited only Congressional and
Presidential approval. The hearings before the House Committee on
the Territories provided only the first stumbling block to approval.
They also presented an opportunity for the Democrats to charge
election fraud and to delay the proceedings. Pro-state forces, recognizing the danger, flooded Washington with statements that the election had been neither crooked nor irregular. Sworn statements came
25. Letter from Holm Bursum to Secundino Romero. Dec. 19. 1910, in Secundino
Romero Papers, on file in University of New Mexico Library.
26. Letter from Clarence J. Roberts to Secundino Romero. Jan. 4. 1911 (misdated
1910), in Romero Papers, supra note 25.
27. House Comm. on the Territories, supra note 24, at 64.

NEWMEXICO LA WREVIEW

from court personnel as well as other territorial leaders, including
memoranda from W. H. Pope, chief justice of the territorial Supreme
Court; Frank W. Parker; David J. Leahy, United States Attorney for
New Mexico and later district judge; and Stephen B. Davis, Leahy's
assistant and later state justice.' 8 Such forceful affidavits along with
Taft's recommendation for approval won both committee and House
approval.
Further delays, however, ensued, with final congressional approval
not coming until August 19, 1911. The machinations of Congress
need no detailed recounting here, although the last-ditch efforts of
the Democrats to defeat the constitution or at least change it do
deserve some comment. This effort centered around the Flood
resolution, which allowed New Mexico's constitution to be amended
by a simple majority vote. 2 9 Fergusson, an author of the resolution,
again fought vigorously for its passage. At stake was whether the
constitution could be changed easily to include progressive principles. Referring to Albert B. Fall and Charles Spiess as "those two
precious specimens of predatory wealth agents of our Territory,"
Fergusson expressed special concern over Fall's objections to the
blue ballot provision of the resolution. This provision ensured that
voters at the first state election could vote for or against an easier
amendment article on a separate, distinctive ballot. If this provision
were changed, it meant probable defeat for the resolution. Said Fergusson, "the schemers will mark ballots beforehand in every county
where they dare do so; and the voters will not be allowed to see any
3
but marked ballots. 0
Final approval of statehood meant a modified amendment resolution and a series of compromises concerning Arizona's admission as
well, all designed to secure President Taft's concurrence and the
admission of both remaining territories as states. New Mexicans were
still to vote on a somewhat easier amendment proposal, with the vote
having no bearing on admission itself. This vote was to be by blue
ballot. Yet no sooner had New Mexico been assured statehood than
again the two parties drew battle lines. The fight began as soon as
Governor William J. Mills called the first state election for November
7, 1911.3' To the Democrats, well aware of the superiority of the
Republican organization, this seemed too soon and quite unfair. But
whatever the date chosen and whatever their apparent strengths,
28. Id. at 135, 168-69, 305.
29. Larson, supra note 1, at 286, 289-90, 293, 296.
30. Letter from Harvey B. Fergusson to Senator George E. Chamberlain, June 17, 1911,
in Fergusson Letters, supra note 21.
31. Larson, supra note 1, at 296-97.
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both parties fought vigorously, for at stake was control of the first
state government.3 2
The Republicans met first, holding their convention in Las Vegas
on September 28. From the outset friends and supporters of Holm
Bursum controlled the proceedings, effecting the nomination of
Bursum for governor on the first ballot. The Bursum faction then
proceeded to dictate most of the remaining nominations and the
report of the resolutions committee condemning the blue ballot.
Overlooking and ignoring the complaints of non-Bursum Republicans, this faction acted in the belief that the Republican majority
was to hold sway and that opposition to Bursum's nomination was
simply overestimated.3 3
George Curry, former territorial governor who received one of the
two nominations for United States Representative, alone spoke
against the party platform:
I told the convention frankly that I felt the condemnation of the
Blue Ballot by the Resolutions Committee was a mistake and that I
would not ask the people of New Mexico for their support and at
the same time tell them they were incapable of amending their own
constitution.
For his efforts Curry very nearly saw his resignation demanded, with
only procedural matters saving his nomination. Such rigidity and
factional control typified the Republican convention. Specifically
with respect to Supreme Court nominations, the convention rewarded party loyalty and incumbency. The positions on the Republican ballot went to Frank W. Parker, Clarence J. Roberts, and
Edward R. Wright, all at the time serving on the last territorial
Supreme Court. 3 4
The Democratic state convention followed on October 2 in Santa
Fe. Joining the gathering were "Independent Republicans" Herbert
J. Hagerman, former territorial governor, and Richard H. Hanna, a
prominent attorney. The result was a fusion ticket headed by the
gubernatorial nominee William C. McDonald, a businessman whose
conservative principles appealed to the business interests of the new
state. Nominated for Supreme Court positions were fusion candidate
Hanna and Democrats Summers Burkhart and W. A. Dunn. In addition to the support rendered the Democratic ticket by Hagerman and
32. On Sept. 15, 1911, for example, Fergusson, fearful of corporate contributions for
Republicans, wrote William Jennings Bryan soliciting money for Democratic candidates.
Letter from Harvey B. Fergusson to William Jennings Bryan, Sept. 15, 1911, in Fergusson

Letters, supra note 21.
33. Twitchell, supra note 10, at 597.
34. G. Curry, George Curry, 1861-1947: An Autiobiography 248-49 (1958).

NEW MEXICO LAWREVIEW

Hanna and their friends throughout the state, the prohibitionists
worked to defeat Republican candidates. The Democrats also helped
their own cause by endorsing the blue ballot, a move that caused
many Republicans to cross party lines at election time.
The ensuing contest was bitter. Hagerman and Hanna waged a
separate campaign under the banner "Progressive Republicans," a
campaign directed specifically against Bursum. They revived the
charges that had led Hagerman to remove Bursum as superintendent
of the state penitentiary and thereby influenced a number of
voters. 3 s To what extent Hanna and the other Democratic Supreme
Court nominees campaigned actively in their own behalf is difficult
to assess. It is clear that both Hanna and Burkhart were active politicians and unlikely to sit out a campaign where their own candidacies
were involved." 6
The Republicans joined the fray just as vigorously. They did agree,
however, that their candidates for the Supreme Court were not to
campaign actively. But when told that he was likely to lose, Frank W.
Parker did not hesitate to go throughout his judicial district and greet
the people. According to Curry's personal account, "while the Judge
made no speeches, he was an expert and tireless handshaker. But for
this trip, I think Parker might have been defeated." ' ' The activities
of the other two Supreme Court nominees are not discussed, but it is
difficult to imagine C. J. Roberts, an extraordinary politician
whether as a legislator, a justice pushing for statehood, or a member
of inner Republican party circles, sitting idly by during his own
election contest.
The November 7 election saw neither side clearly victoriousDemocrats carried the statehouse but lost both legislative houses.
The rest of the state offices were fairly evenly split, with Parker,
Roberts and Hanna winning seats on the Supreme Court. The voters
also expressed overwhelming approval of the blue ballot. How the
Democrats, so badly outmaneuvered at the constitutional convention, could have done so well in 1911 has evoked much discussion.
Curry, an active participant in that election, was convinced that
Republican opposition to the blue ballot was the major reason.
Twitchell, also a contemporaneous observer, saw it as a rebuke to
35. Id. at 260-61; and Twitchell, supra note 10, at 599-600.
36. Burkhart, although defeated in 1911, remained most active in Democratic party
circles. In November 1912 he wrote Andrew H. Hudspeth, a future justice, soliciting party
endorsement for a federal appointment and advocating a meeting of the party's central
committee to consider federal patronage. Letter from Summers Burkhart to Andrew H.
Hudspeth, Nov. 26, 1912, in Andrew H. Hudspeth Correspondence, on file in University of
New Mexico Library.
37. Curry, supra note 34, at 261.
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boss rule and machine methods and by no means a triumph for
democratic principles. A recent scholar has simply attributed it to
the too strong combination of Democrats and Progressive Republicans. Still another has assessed it in terms of the fragility of the Old
Guard's power.' ' Whatever the reasons for the outcome of the election, New Mexico had entered the statehood era.
Statehood did not, at the same time, mean a total break with the
past. Indeed, the first state Supreme Court was a direct product of
years of cumulative thinking concerning the judiciary and its place
within the governmental system. As territorial conditions and politics
became more complex, attitudes toward the judiciary shifted.
Accordingly, political leaders began to demand courts responsible to
territorial conditions and to the people who resided therein. Lawyers
recognized their considerable political influence and looked to the
courts as their special province within the structure of government.
These attitudes found expression in the constitution of 1889 and at
bar association meetings. They were realized in the new state constitution.
Specifically, the judiciary as established reflected the political
temper of the times in several ways. First, judges were elected on a
partisan basis during the general election, chosen, in other words,
along with the other partisanly elected state officers. Second, judges
were, especially at the district court level, responsible to the voters,
to the will of the people. Finally, the Supreme Court, given its jurisdiction and "the intent of the framers," was to act as a conservative
influence to curb efforts toward progressive legislation or corporate
regulation.
The new Supreme Court justices also mirrored these prevailing
attitudes, although certainly to varying degrees. Frank W. Parker
(who served on the Supreme Court-both territorial and state-for
more than 30 years) was an ideological conservative slow to change.
He was a Republican with strong Old Guard connections but did not
actively participate in inner-party circles. Clarence J. Roberts was
also a conservative and, more importantly, a seasoned party veteran.
He played a more active political role than Parker, maintaining close
ties with Republican leaders throughout the state. Richard H. Hanna,
the third member of the court, won election as a Progressive Republican. A most active politician, as demonstrated in his campaign
against Bursum, Hanna later ran as a Democrat for both governor and
United States Senator.
38. Id.; Twitchell, supra note 10, at 601; Larson, supra note 1 at 298; and Holmes, supra
note 5, at 148.
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Whatever their individual persuasion, these three justices joined
together to serve on the first state Supreme Court. Basically, they
wrote a conservative record. Of special significance were their early
decisions concerning the Corporation Commission, decisions that
would prevail for years. All in all, the framers of the judiciary article,
Parker and Roberts among them, could not have been more pleased.
THE REPUBLICAN COURT, 1912-1922

The New Mexico Supreme Court during the first decade of statehood made an indelible impression on the political process. From the
outset it proved to be the conservative force the framers intended it
to be, a fact quite evident in its handling of corporation matters. The
court also decided some political cases, one such case involving partisan manipulation of the district court structure. In terms of personnel Republicans dominated, a domination little affected by the high
turnover of justices in the early 1920s. In short, the nascent state
Supreme Court acted out its role in the governmental structure
politically and did so through highly political court officers.
As already seen, the nature of politics as New Mexico embarked
on its new status in 1910 through 1912 was conservative. This persuasion shaped the judiciary article and affected the selection of the
first Supreme Court justices. It also determined the kind of Corporation Commission the new state would have, its regulatory powers
dictated by constitutional provisions. Specifically, the constitution
provided that
... the commission shall have power and be charged with the duty
of fixing, determining, supervising, regulating and controlling all
charges and rates of railway, express, telegraph, telephone, sleeping
cars, and other transportation and transmission companies and
common carriers within the state. ... 39

While granting the Commission what appeared adequate power to
regulate rates in the public interest and what seemed extensive
regulatory powers in other areas, the framers of this article made sure
the Commission's orders were reviewable. Thus, if a corporation refused compliance with a Commission order or unless it removed that
order to the Supreme Court, it became the obligation of the Commission itself to remove the issue. The Court was to sit in continuous
session for consideration of such cases and give them precedence.
This section of the constitution then ended on the note that
39. N.M. Const. art. 11, § 7.

